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Govshtein: Justice Scalia and His Meta-Cannon of Absurdity

NOTE
JUSTICE SCALIA AND HIS
META-CANON OF ABSURDITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

A blind woman sits at home eagerly searching the Internet. She has
recently purchased brand new software that allows her, for the first time
in her life, to access this new invention, the World Wide Web. She is
finally going to be able to do one of the many things she has never been
able to do before-buy furniture without the help of anyone at all. This
brand new software of hers will read, out loud, the description of every
piece of furniture pictured on the website, allowing her to "browse" at
her own pace, through the entire inventory of her favorite store. She will
be able to compare prices, explore fabric options, even color coordinate.
The independence that this will grant her cannot be measured in
monetary terms. It will be the first time that a friend or family member is
not burdened with the duties of driving her to a store and standing
behind her while describing the various colors, shapes, and details of
every piece of furniture. It will be the first time that she will not have to
second guess the advice of the store clerk who, when faced with a blind
woman, will readily lie about what looks good just to make a
commission. It will also be the first time that she will be able to shop
without knowing that every pair of eyes in the store is focused on her
and her ubiquitous white cane that no matter what color you paint it, still
looks exactly like what it is, and never fails to draw attention.
However, this woman's sense of freedom and independence is
short-lived because the website that she has chosen is incompatible with
her brand new software. The software cannot tell her what the furniture
at her favorite store looks like. It cannot even tell her what it costs. The
website is incompatible with her software because the website designers
have chosen to make it this way. She has gone back to square one, with
no independence, no freedom, and without the ability to do what average
consumers do every day without thinking twice. It would seem that our
justice system would provide a solution for this woman. After all, she is
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being discriminated against based on the store's refusal to accommodate
her disability by making modest changes to its website. But our justice
system has no answer for her. Our circuits are currently split about
whether or not this woman deserves her independence.' They are split on
whether or not being excluded from the Internet is just one more thing
that she should learn to deal with, like people staring, or salespeople
lying. The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") should protect this
woman. And in some circuits it does. But not in those circuits that
follow the dictates of Justice Scalia and his new meta-canon, and the
absurd results that it creates.
Justice Scalia, through his role on the Supreme Court, has created a
new meta-canon, which, as it has been applied by both the Justice
himself 2 and by those who adhere to his strictly textualist philosophy,
3
states that all unclear statutes must be read narrowly. Recent decisions
involving the application of Title III of the ADA to the Internet show
that Justice Scalia's new canon of statutory interpretation will often lead
to absurd and unintended results. The case studies within this Note will
show that various circuits have taken Justice Scalia's meta-canon to its,
arguably, inevitable conclusion, and expanded it so that the meta-canon
now reads that all statutes must be read narrowly.
It will further be shown that the application of Justice Scalia's
meta-canon is unwarranted in this context for numerous reasons. First,
the meta-canon requires judges to consciously ignore the stated purpose
of the ADA 4 and analogous precedent. Additionally, the meta-canon
negates any influence that the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), an agency
in charge of interpreting and enforcing the ADA, might have on
establishing the meaning of the statute. It will be shown that within the
context of the ADA, the application of this new meta-canon, the ultimate
5
illustration of the "fire-breathing conservatives.., led by Scalia," leads
1. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that such discrimination constitutes a redressable
injury. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
Alternatively, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a complaint alleging such discrimination cannot
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227
F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1317-21 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
2. See infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
3. Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, The Muzak of Justice Scalia's Revolutionary Call to Read
Unclear Statutes Narrowly, 53 SMU L. REV. 121, 140 (2000).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2000) (stating that it is the purpose of the Americans with
Disabilities Act "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities").
5. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT
DEFINED AMERICA 180 (2007).
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to absurd results that could not have been contemplated or intended by
Congress when it enacted the ADA.
II.

THE DEBATE OVER LEGISLATIVE INTENT

In order to properly understand both the purpose and the impetus
behind Justice Scalia's apparent view that unclear statutes must be read
narrowly, a brief overview of the current debate regarding the methods
by which statutes are interpreted and the role of legislative intent in that
interpretation is necessary. Legislative intent, within the context of this
discussion refers to legislative history, as it exists in extrinsic sources or
"outside of the language of the statute at issue in the litigation. ' '6
Extrinsic sources include, for example, committee reports and certain
congressional debates regarding the statute at issue. 7
For the purposes of this Note, the two opposing sides of the
legislative intent debate will be referred to as "intentionalists" and
"textualists. ' 8 Intentionalists are those judges and scholars who look to
the intent of Congress in determining the meaning of an unclear statute. 9
Textualists are those judges and scholars who prefer to glean the purpose
of the statute from the text and only the text and share an inherent
distrust of the very notion of congressional intent.° While the arguments
on both sides are complex and have been subject to scrutiny in a variety
of academic settings, the arguments can be briefly summarized as
follows.
Intentionalists essentially argue that the legislature, in passing a
statute, has a general intent regarding what that statute should mean and
what effect it should have, and that such intent cannot be determined by
looking solely at the words used in the text of the statute itself. I They
argue that ignoring extrinsic evidence of legislative intent will increase
the "likelihood of a court's accepting an interpretation that is absurdly at
odds with the intentions of the enacting legislature"' 2 and therefore
circumventing the will of the legislature and undermining "legislative

6. Mikva & Lane, supra note 3, at 129.
7. Id. at 131; United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 546-48 (1940).
8. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 423-24 (2005).
9. Id. at 419.
10. Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative
Intent in Statutory Interpretation,93 GEO. L.J. 427,433 (2005).
11. See Manning, supra note 8, at 423-24.
12. See Solan, supra note 10, at 432.
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primacy.' ' 3 The scenario that the intentionalists feared may well have
come to pass in some of the circuit court's interpretations of the ADA.
The textualist critique stems in large part from an inherent distrust
in both the legislative process and in the legislators themselves.
Congress is seen as an "overreaching institution with questionable
'4
processes bent on furthering the interests of various special interests,"'
which, due to its varied membership and complicated processes, is
incapable of having a coherently identifiable intent.1 5 Individual
legislators are often critiqued for not having sufficient knowledge of any
individual piece of legislation and voting in a certain way simply
because party loyalty, or their own personal ambitions, require them to
do so.' 6 Furthermore, textualists fear that if legislative intent is
consistently given great weight by the courts, legislators will attempt to
corrupt the process by "planting" legislative history in an attempt to
influence the judicial system. 7 "[A]nyone familiar with modem-day
drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the
references ... were inserted ... at worst by a committee staff member at
the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references
was... to influence judicial construction."' 8 These suspicions of
legislative history and intent have led to a certain rigid attitude towards
statutory construction. As Justice Scalia himself put it, the textualist
philosophy is that "[w]e are here to apply the statute, not legislative
history ...[s]tatutes are the law."' 9

13. Id. at 432. The Supreme Court has repeatedly focused on the idea of legislative primacy,
essentially the notion that the legislature should be deferred to because "in a democratic society
legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of
the people." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); accord Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175-76 (1976) (plurality opinion).
14. See Mikva & Lane,supra note 3, at 121.
15. See Manning, supra note 8, at 424.
16. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 80-81 (1991); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 48,
100-01 (1974).

17. John F. Manning, Textualism As a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 68788 (1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict
Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401,420 (1994).

18. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
19. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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III.

THE USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AS A TOOL OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Through the common law, settled rules have developed outlining
when the use of legislative history, and other tools of statutory
interpretation such as canons of statutory construction, 2° is permissible.
One of the most oft-cited rules is the "plain meaning rule, ' 2' which, as
articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, states that "[w]here there is no
ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. 22 However,
when a statute is unclear, "the court may look into prior and
contemporaneous acts, the reasons which induced the act in question, the
mischiefs intended to be remedied, the extraneous circumstances, and
the purpose intended to be accomplished by it, to determine its proper
construction. '23 Despite these well-settled rules, courts often look to
extrinsic evidence of legislative intent even when a statute appears clear
on its face. As Justice Holmes stated, "[i]t is said that when the meaning
of language is plain we are not to resort to evidence in order to raise
doubts.... [this] does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence
if it exists. '24 The idea that relying on congressional history should be
relegated to only those circumstances where the statute is unclear has
been refuted in other Supreme Court cases, such as United States v.
American Trucking Ass 'ns, where the Court stated that "[w]hen aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available,
there certainly can be no 'rules of law' which forbids its use, however
clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination."'' 25 This
explains why some say thai "[n]o occasion for statutory construction
20. There are numerous canons of statutory interpretation that are used in the legal field and a
detailed analysis of their relevance and the critiques attached to each are beyond the scope of this
analysis. For a broader discussion of canons of construction see, for example, Symposium, Theories
of Statutory Interpretation (And Their Limits), 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1899 (2005); Ebon Moglen &
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein 's New Canons: Choosing the Fictionsof Statutory Interpretation,57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (1990). For a concise discussion of the canons relevant to this analysis, see
infra notes 158-71 and accompanying text.
21. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 495 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455 (1989); Watt v. Alaska, 451
U.S. 259, 266 (1981); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 13 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Mohasco
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 828 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Simpson v. United States, 435
U.S. 6, 17 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. J-T Transp. Co., 368
U.S. 81, 107 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444 (1955) (plurality opinion); Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1, 31 (1948); United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
22. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95-96 (1820).
23. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419 (1899).
24. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41,48 (1928).
25. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 543-44.
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26
now exists when the Court will not look at the legislative history. This
runs in direct contrast to some of the views expressed in the nineteenth
century, when Justice Story, a predecessor of Justice Scalia, stated that
judges should adhere to "the fair meaning of the words of the text" and
not the "'probable meaning' of persons, whom they never knew, and
whose opinions, and means of information, may be no better than their

own."

27

It is illustrative to note that after the Supreme Court's decision in
American Trucking Ass'ns, "many judges, lawyers, and scholars
' 28 In
presumed [that] the plain meaning rule had suffered its demise.
fact, up until Justice Scalia's appointment to the Court in 1986, the plain
meaning rule was occasionally referred to by the Supreme Court, but
29
was never actually relied on as a basis for a decision. The plain
meaning rule has clearly seen a resurgence of its popularity. There are
several circuits that have subscribed to Justice Scalia's meta-canon, and
do not utilize the "persuasive evidence." They instead rest on what the
Supreme Court, prior to Justice Scalia's presence, called a "superficial
examination. 3 °
Textualists of course provide a justification for their refusal to
utilize this persuasive evidence, and their unadulterated adherence to the
text of the statute. For textualists, if a legislative intent is to be
ascertained and deemed relevant, then the text of the statute is the only
tool for the job. "[P]rimacy of the language and structure of the statute
the law.",31
[is] the basis for discerning Congress' intent in enacting
Furthermore, textualists like Justice Scalia tend to express an extremely
disdainful view of the idea that legislative history can clarify
congressional intent, or the meaning of a statute. "If one were to search
for an interpretive technique that, on the whole, was more likely to
confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more promising
candidate than legislative history. 32
26. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 195 (1983).
27. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 407,

at 390 n.I (Da Capo Press 1970) (1833).
28. Eric S. Lasky, Note, Perplexing Problems with PlainMeaning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 891,
895 (1999).

29. See Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-MeaningRule" and Statutory
Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1301-08 (1975);
Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 436.
30. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 544.
31. Eric W. Lam, The Limit and Inconsistency of Application of the Plain Meaning Rule to
Selected Provisionsof the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 111, 111 (1996).

32.

Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia would ardently oppose those, like Justice Holmes,
who say that legislative intent is relevant to the inquiry in all cases
regardless of the clarity of the statute. "Scalia has argued that his
[textualist] methodology is supported by the constitutional principle
against delegation of lawmaking authority to legislative subgroups. ' 33 In
other words, his meta-canon is necessary because anything that strays
away from a strict plain meaning approach is simply judicial lawmaking,
or judicial activism. However, "[e]ven friendly commentators find
Scalia's reasoning to be an insufficient basis to prohibit all reference to
legislative history. 3 4
Justice Scalia's refusal to grant credence to legislative intent in
"clear statutes" presents the interesting dilemma of identifying what
exactly constitutes a clear statute. An unclear statute, as defined by
Justice Brown, is one that is "susceptible upon its face of two
constructions. 3 5 This creates a dilemma, as it is arguable that language
being what it is, a fluid and multifaceted thing, all statutes could
potentially be susceptible to multiple constructions. As will be shown,
courts have differed as to whether the ADA is in fact a "clear" statute
that needs no tools of statutory interpretation to help discern its meaning,
or whether it is in fact "unclear."
A.

Clarity of the ADA

Various courts have come to different conclusions as to the clarity
of the ADA. In Carparts Distribution Center Inc. v. Automotive
Wholesaler'sAss 'n of New England, Inc., the First Circuit found that the
phrase "public accommodation" was ambiguous.36 In Access Now, Inc.
v. Southwest Airlines Co., the court found that the Internet website of
Southwest Airlines was not covered by the ADA because "Internet" or
"website[]" was not in the plain language of the statute. 37 However, the
list of "public accommodations" within the ADA does include "travel
service." 38 The plaintiffs argued that the ADA did in fact apply because
Southwest Airlines was operating a travel service. 39 The court reiterated

33.

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not

Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1311 (1998).

34. Id.
35. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419 (1899).
36. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12,
19 (1st Cir. 1994).
37. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2000).
39. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1319 n.8.
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that since the Internet was not in the plain*language of the statute, and
since the statute was clear, the ADA did not apply to Southwest's
website. 40 The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in finding that
the ADA was unambiguous. 41 The aforementioned courts read this case
in perfect accordance with Justice Scalia's meta-canon. Although the
courts found that the statute was clear, they still chose to read it an
extremely narrow fashion, relying only on the bare text of the statute and
with a willful disregard of the ADA's purpose clause,42 despite strong
arguments to the contrary.
Southwest Airlines Inc., which will be discussed in greater depth
later in this analysis, is an ideal illustration of how some courts extend
Justice Scalia's meta-canon to*read not only that all unclear statutes must
be read narrowly,, but also that all statutes must be read narrowly. This
presents various issues, not the least of which is that the ADA is difficult
to construe as a "clear" statute in no need of interpretative tools. First
and foremost, the ADA does not actually define "places of public
accommodation." It states only that these "places" must fall within the
listed categories.4 3 To assert that this is perfectly clear, particularly when
attempting to resolve questions regarding matters not on the list, is
somewhat illogical, as is illustrated by the circuit split regarding the
clarity of the statute.
The Supreme Court has weighed in on the debate over defining a
certain piece of legislation as clear or unclear. The Court has noted that
"there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing 'plain' or
'unambiguous' language. 44 This is starkly illustrated by the fact that in
the spring of the 1993 Term, the court disagreed on the "plain" meaning
of more than one in five statutes.45 As such, one of the fatal flaws of both
Justice Scalia's meta-canon and the plain meaning rule is illuminated. If
everyone disagrees on what the meaning is, how can we ever assert that
a statute is really clear, or even has a plain meaning?

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1319 & n.8.
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601,614 (3d Cir. 1998).
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000).
Id. § 12181(7).

44.

United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).

45.

George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 356 n.162 (1995). The

number includes all cases decided, and is not limited to just those cases involving statutory
interpretation; the cases involving interpretation of constitutional provisions were excluded. Id.
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Technology and the Internet

In order to properly understand the underlying issues presented in
the following case analyses, it is necessary to first explore the
technological concerns that led to the debate over the application of Title
III of the ADA to the Internet. As of 2000, ninety-eight percent of
websites were not accessible to the disabled because the websites were
not compatible with the software utilized by disabled individuals to
access the Internet.4 6
The technology that would allow a blind person to access a website
is nothing more than a piece of software which would "read" the text of
the website out loud and would allow that individual to use a specialized
keyboard to input any necessary data.47 However, these screen access
programs have various limitations.48 For instance, when the software
sees a graphic or an icon, it will alert the user that there is an icon or
graphic present, but cannot determine its meaning. 49 Design choices
strongly impact the software's ability to translate the text, as when a web
page designer chooses to embed words within a picture or "otherwise
artistically render [the] text, 5 ° thereby making the text illegible to the
"reading" program.
The measures a company would be required to take in order to
make their website compatible with the software the blind need to access
the Internet would be, according to some, "unobtrusive, inexpensive and
easily accomplished, [and] the small amount of additional regulation
implicated in web access would not dramatically alter the environment
of cyberspace.",51 Furthermore, website designers would not face
constrictive design requirements. 52
Other industrial nations, functioning under their own versions of the
ADA, have adopted web access guidelines. England and Australia have
extended these guidelines to the private sector. 53 There is no indication
46. Patrick Maroney, The Wrong Tool for the Right Job: Are Commercial Websites Places of
Public Accommodation Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990?, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. &
PRAc. 191, 192 (2000).
47. Symposium, The Internet: Place, Property, or Thing-All or None of the Above? 55
MERCER L. REv. 867, 872 (2004) (comments of Tim Willis); Maroney, supra note 46, at 192.
48. Maroney, supra note 46, at 192.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Steven Mendelsohn & Martin Gould, When the Americans with Disabilities Act Goes
Online: Application of the ADA to the Internet and the World Wide Web, 8 COMPUTER L. REV. &
TECH. J. 173,206 (2004).
52. Id. at 207.
53. See JIM THATCHER ET AL., CONSTRUCTING ACCESSIBLE WEB CITES 42, 47 (2002).
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that these guidelines have had any major impact on the functioning of
either business or the Internei in those regions.54 Furthermore, many
entities, both public and private, have chosen to adopt web content
accessibility guidelines and several websites were voluntarily redesigned
to be accessible to the disabled.5 5
IV.

JUSTICE SCALIA AND HIS METHODOLOGIES

"Scalia is first and foremost a legal formalist-meaning that to him,
the rules are the rules." 56 Justice Scalia's adherence to the textualist
doctrine can only partially be explained by anyone other than the Justice
himself. However, it is undoubtable that his unwillingness to place great
trust in legislative intent stems at least in part from the "strong suspicion
of Congress [that he developed] while working for Republican
presidents in the post-Watergate era." 57 Justice Scalia's disdain for
legislative intent and the use of legislative history cannot be
underestimated. "In the 1996 Term, for example, Scalia went so far as to
refuse to join a footnote of an opinion that he otherwise joined
completely. This offending footnote merely said '[w]e give no weight to
the legislative history' and briefly explained why., 58 In National Credit
Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co. 59 "Scalia
joined the rest of the opinion but pointedly refused to join the footnote
relying on legislative history as secondary support for the Court's
holding., 60 In Landgrafv. USI Film Products,61 Scalia went so far as to
"chide[] Justice Stevens for looking beyond the plain language.., to see
62
whether the legislative history might indicate a Congressional intent.,
Even a mere mention of the use of legislative history, or intent, was
clearly more than the Justice could bear.
Justice Scalia's views of statutory interpretation, and the
development of his meta-canon, are closely linked to this inherent
distrust of Congress and to the Justice's unwillingness to abandon bright
line rules and his, some would say overly, "consistent application of

54. Mendelsohn & Gould, supra note 51, at 207.
55. Id. at 207-08.
56.
57.

Scott Turow, Scalia the Civil Libertarian?,N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 26, 2006, at 22.
ROSEN, supranote 5, at 180.

58. Eskridge, supranote 33, at 1306.
59.

522 U.S. 479 (1998).

60. Eskridge, supra note 33, at 1307.
61.
62.

511 U.S. 244 (1994).
Linda Greenhouse, High CourtLimits 1991 Civil Rights Law to New Cases, N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 27, 1994, at A18.
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the ... textualism methodology." 63 This strict adherence to textualism
has led to the Justice's inability "to build a conservative consenus" on
the Court,64 and has left him on the fringes of many majority opinions.65
In fact, "between 1996 and 2003, Scalia wrote more dissenting opinions
than any other conservative justice, and also was less likely than all the
other conservative justices to vote with the majority of the Court. 66
While this certainly shows that his influence has been less than
extraordinary when it comes to his ability to sway his fellow members of
the court, his doctrinal views have greatly influenced lower courts'
rulings, particularly within the context of the ADA.67
Justice Scalia's inability to depart from his meta-canon has,
arguably, made him a less effective Supreme Court Justice, as "the more
influential and effective justice [is] the one more willing to moderate the
application of his principles in the name of the broader good of the Court
and the country." 68 Doctrinal objections to Justice Scalia are just as
numerous as objections about certain aspects of his personality. The
Justice has been described as "lord[ing] his intelligence over his
colleagues,, 69 and in remarking on his presence on the Supreme Court,
stated: "[w]hat's a smart guy like me doing in a place like this?" 70 The
critiques of Justice Scalia also often fall along party lines. "Justice
Scalia's flamethrowing rhetoric and his hostility to whole chapters of
20th-centiry jurisprudence have made him a conservative icon and a
favorite face on liberal dart boards.'
However, the greatest critiques stem not from a personal dislike of
the Justice, but rather from a fear of the effects on societal principles and
institutions that a broad adoption of his methodologies will have. This
fear was both realized and justified when scholars came to the
realization that "[t]he legalists, led by Scalia, preferred to interpret

63. Kristi Kress Wilhelmy, Comment, Breaking Scalia's Silence: The Dissent Justice Scalia
Might Have Written in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
34 U. TOL. L. REv. 611,638 (2003).
64. Autumn Fox & Stephen R. McAllister, An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudenceof Justice
Antonin Scalia, 19 CAMPBELL L. REv. 223, 223 (1997).
65. For a partial listing of cases in which Justice Scalia has filed a dissenting or concurring
opinion in a statutory interpretation case see infra note 195.
66. ROSEN, supranote 5, at 201.
67. See infra Part VI.
68.

ROSEN, supranote 5,at 21.

69. Id. at 203.
70.
71.

Id.
Turow, supra note 56, at 22.
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laws ... strictly and were perfectly happy to rule72 against Congress
without worrying about the practical consequences.,
Justice Scalia's meta-canon and the plain meaning rule were
arguably rejected by the Supreme Court in 1892 as the ultimate
framework for analyzing a statute. In Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States,73 the Court was faced with a statute that made it unlawful
for anyone to pay for an "alien's" transportation into the United States
for the purposes of performing "labor or service of any kind. ' 74 When
the Church of the Holy Trinity attempted to hire a British pastor, it
appeared that the Church ran afoul of the law. 75 The Court rejected the
plain meaning approach because it would have created an "absurd
result[]" ' 76 as Congress could not have intended such consequences when
passing the law.77 The Court's realization that an absurd result should be
avoided even if the plain meaning of the statute would mandate such a
result runs directly contrary to Justice Scalia's meta-canon. The Court's
focus on legislative intent and the purpose of the statute is antithetical to
the meta-canon, as it requires judges to stray from the meaning of the
text and focus at least some of their attention on fairness, reason, and
justice. Even though the statute in Church of the Holy Trinity was clear,
the Supreme Court realized, as Justice Scalia has not, that bright line
rules must sometimes be abandoned in favor of avoiding absurdity. In
the context of Justice Scalia's meta-canon, it is not the result that
matters, it is the process by which the result is achieved that is
tantamount. The Church of the Holy Trinity was capable of hiring the
pastor of its choice only because of the Supreme Court's willingness to
ignore the plain meaning of the statute to avoid the potential absurd
result of their ruling. For the blind individuals who are the focus of the
following case analysis, only a rejection of Justice Scalia's meta-canon
will allow them to avoid online discrimination.
There are many who doubt Justice Scalia's ability to influence
Supreme Court decisions, which may come as fantastic news or
apocalyptic prophecies, depending on which side of the political
spectrum one happens to reside.78 However, Justice Scalia's immediate
influence is, ultimately, not of the greatest concern. After all, dissenting
72.

ROSEN, supra note 5, at 207.

73.

143 U.S. 457 (1892).

74. Id. at 458.
75.

Id. at 457-58.

76. Id. at 459.
77.

Id. ("It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not

within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.").
78. ROSEN, supra note 5, at 218.
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opinions do sometimes become majority opinions. Justice Scalia, in fact,
recognizes this limitation. "Unable to persuade his colleagues, Scalia has
confessed that he writes with 'verve and panache' to ensure that his
opinions are quoted by the editors of legal textbooks, so they can
influence future generations of lawyers and scholars., 79 It is this future
influence that could do the most harm both to the interpretation of the
ADA and to other yet unknown statutes. It may yet hold true that Justice
Scalia's sway over the future may be tempered by his "isolation as a law
professor [which] has given his opinions an academic quality that may
limit his ultimate influence. 8 ° However, if these predictions
underestimate Justice Scalia's power to shape the future of legal
thinking, and the textualist reading advocated by Justice Scalia is
adopted by future generations, it will lead to a limiting of rights for not
only the disabled, but for others yet unnamed.
V.

THE PURPOSE OF THE ADA

The following case analyses will focus, to a certain extent, on the
purpose of the ADA. When courts refer to the "purpose" of the ADA,
they may be referring to the "purpose clause" of the ADA itself6 1 or to
other external indicators of congressional intent. The Supreme Court has
stated that it is a "familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial
legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes., 82 It is
recognized by both sides of the ADA debate that when the statute was
enacted both Congress and the President "intended [the ADA] to be
broad in scope and reach all areas of existing society. 83 In fact, the
statement of purpose within the ADA states that the ADA is intended "to
invoke the sweep of congressional authority... in order to address the
major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities. ,,84
Several scholars and courts have noted that reading the ADA in a
narrow strict textualist fashion, even if such a reading were appropriate,
would be antithetical to the purpose of the statute. The Eleventh Circuit
highlighted the fact that the ADA was passed in large part to break down
communications barriers that prevented the disabled from enjoying the
79. ROSEN, supra note 5, at 219 (quoting RALPH
JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION 205 (2006)).

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

A. ROSSUM,

ANTONIN SCALIA'S

ROSEN, supra note 5, at 220.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2000).
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
Maroney, supra note 46, at 198-99.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2000).
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same goods and services as the non-disabled population. Allowing
websites to discriminate against the disabled by immunizing them from
ADA requirements erects just the kind of barriers that Congress was
trying to destroy. Even those who oppose an expansive reading of the
ADA admit that "[t]he ADA was enacted to make strides in eradicating
the exclusion of the disabled from social, commercial, and labor
settings, '8 6 a purpose somewhat negated by the exclusion of the Internet
from coverage under the ADA.
Furthermore, as the Internet gains even greater importance in
commercial transactions and nearly every other aspect of people's dayto-day lives, and as "the modem economy increases the percentage of
goods and services available through a marketplace that does not consist
of physical structures, ' 87 not applying the requirements of the ADA to
the Internet will result in a situation in which "the protections of Title III
will become increasingly diluted." 88 A strict textualist reading, however,
would require just such a dilution of Title III protections. Justice Scalia
would undoubtedly counsel that the legislature's intent in passing the
ADA is irrelevant, as "[w]e are governed by laws, not by the intentions
of legislators. 89
Several circuits have noted the dangers of limiting the scope of the
ADA, and have chosen to remedy what is clearly a problem. The
remedy, however, directly contradicts the dictates of Justice Scalia's
meta-canon.
VI.

NATIONAL FEDERA TON OF THE BLIND V. TARGET CORP.

The dispute between the National Federation of the Blind and
Target Corp. is an illustrative example of a court refusing to comply
with Justice Scalia's meta-canon. This case is a clear case study of how
intentionalists view and interpret unclear statues. With an eye toward the
actual effects that reading the ADA narrowly would have on the lives of
ordinary disabled Americans, the court chose to utilize all of the sources
of statutory interpretation available to it, and not stop at a merely
superficial reading of the statute. As the motions for summary judgment
were argued quite recently, it is uncertain what will happen with this
case in the future. However, courts within the Ninth Circuit have already
85.
86.
87.

Symposium, supra note 47, at 875 (comments of Tim Willis).
Maroney, supra note 46, at 193.
Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1020 (6th Cir. 1997) (Martin, C.J.,

dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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adopted the precedent set by this case 9° and acceptance of this
interpretation of the ADA is growing.
The defendant in this case, Target Corp., centered its argument on
the fact that the ADA covered access only to "physical spaces,"
reasoning that "[s]ince Target.com is not a physical space," the
complaint did not state a claim. 9' It further argued that the plaintiffs did
not state a claim because they did not allege that they were denied
physical access to Target stores. Additionally, while it is accepted that a
claim may be stated for unequal access to a service, in order for the
claim to survive, the court determined that there must be some
space,
connection or "nexus" between the service and the actual physical
92
bar.
at
case
the
in
lacking
was
alleged
defendant
the
which
The plaintiffs' main contention was that "Target.com denies the
blind the full enjoyment of the goods and services offered at Target
stores, which are places of public accommodation. 9 3 Article III of the
ADA states in part:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns,
94 leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation.
The court defined "discrimination" as encompassing "the denial of the
opportunity, by the disabled, to participate in programs or services, and
providing the disabled with separate, but unequal, goods or services." 95
The court focused on the language of the statute, stating that it indicated
that the defendant's argument was misplaced as "[t]he statute applies to
the services of a place of public accommodation, not services in a place
of public accommodation., 96 Therefore, the court determined that
applying the reasoning of the defendant would limit the ADA in
contradiction to the plain meaning of the statute. 97 It is interesting to note
that while the court determined that the statute was clear, it still refused
to read it in the narrow manner that the defendant argued for, and that
90. Milsap v. U-Haul Truck Rental Co., No. CIV 06-0209, 2006 WL 3797731, at *9-10 (D.
Ariz. Dec. 20, 2006).
91. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 950 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
92. Id. at 952.
93. Id.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
95. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 951 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(A)(i-iii)).
96. Id. at 953.
97. Id.
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Justice Scalia's meta-canon dictates. In fact, the court's view that a strict
construction of the statute would limit the ADA in contradiction to its
plain meaning is simply another way of saying that a strict textualist
approach to the statute would lead to an absurd result.
As was evidenced in the Target Corp. case, some argue that there is
a middle ground between interpreting the ADA to apply to all websites
and excluding the Internet completely from ADA requirements. This
approach is often referred to as the "nexus" approach. The nexus
approach would apply the ADA to those websites that have a concrete
connection to a physical place. 98 Since Target Corp. maintains actual
physical stores, and since those stores offer largely the same goods and
services as the Target website, there is a nexus, or connection, between
the two and therefore the ADA should apply.
For those courts that have adopted the more expansive reading of
the ADA, the nexus approach comprises, essentially, an element that
must be addressed in order for a valid claim to be asserted. For instance,
some courts have held that a claim that does not allege that the plaintiff
was discriminated against in an actual physical location survives a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 99 Such an omission "in and
of itself does not entitle [defendant] to dismissal of plaintiffs Title III
ADA claim." 100 However, in order to survive a motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff must allege, at the very least, that there is some
connection between the services offered at the physical location and the
discriminatory conduct that plaintiff alleges.' 0°
As to the argument that a nexus or relationship is required between
the service offered and the physical space, the court in Target Corp.
stated that "it is clear that the purpose of the statute is broader than mere
physical access,"10 2 insinuating that the relationship need not be as
precise as the defendant seemed to argue. However, the court
nevertheless found that there was a nexus between Target.com and the
physical Target store as "the challenged service here is heavily
integrated with the brick-and-mortar stores and operates in many ways
as a gateway to the stores.'' 0 °

98.

Symposium, supra note 47, at 787 (comments of Richard E. Moberly).

99.

See, e.g., Milsap v. U-Haul Truck Rental Co., No. CIV 06-0209, 2006 WL 3797731, at

*10 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2006).
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

103. Id.at 955.
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The court also rejected the defendant's argument that there is a
clear distinction between "those services which impede physical access
to a public accommodation [which would be covered by the ADA] and
those merely offered by the facility [which defendant argued would not
be covered by the ADA]., 10 4 The court noted that "[s]uch an
interpretation would effectively limit the scope of Title III to the
provisions of ramps, elevators and other aids that operate to remove
physical barriers to entry," 105 and would therefore go against
congressional intent in passing the ADA in the first place.
Numerous scholars within the field have advanced the broad
reading of the ADA adopted by the Target Corp. court.
Those who support the law's application in the cyberspace cite the
enormous and increasingly central role played by the Internet in
education, employment, commerce, and even social and family
life.... [I]n light of these changes to our society, denial of access to
Internet... condemns Americans with disabilities to fewer
opportunities and second-class citizenship. A statute with the broad
ameliorative purposes of the ADA, if it is not to be rendered a
mockery, must possess the capacity and flexibility to cover those
functions, services, and activities on the web that are identical in
purpose and effect to those that are expressly covered when provided
in person.106
The Internet's omnipresent role in the average American's day-to-day
life and the manner in which it could increase a disabled individual's
is a major rationale for expanding the application of the
independence
10 7
ADA.
The role that the Internet has come to play in Americans' every day
lives has been taken into account by more than one court. In addition to
the cases discussed in detail within this analysis, other courts have stated
that the ADA should not be read narrowly and should not be limited in
its scope. This is due in part to the actual wording of the statute and
largely based on the fact that "the ADA 0is8 a broad and remedial statute,
applicable in several different contexts.'
Conversely, there are credible arguments to be made for why a
narrow reading of the statute might very well be mandated, particularly
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
Dec. 20,

Id.
Id.
Mendelsohn & Gould, supra note 51, at 177-78.
Maroney, supra note 46, at 199.
Milsap v. U-Haul Truck Rental Co., No. CIV 06-0209, 2006 WL 3797731, at *5 (D. Ariz.
2006).
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from the strictly textualist perspective advocated for by Justice Scalia.
As some commentators point out, the idea that the Internet is a "place" is
somewhat irrational. "[T]he idea that the Internet is literally a place in
which people travel is not only wrong but faintly ludicrous. No one is
'in' cyberspace. The Internet is merely a simple computer protocol, a
piece of code that permits computer users to transmit data."' 10 9
However, the Internet is often described as a place because we
understand and experience the Internet as though it is a place to which
we go and in which we find information. 11° "We visit a website. We
meet people in a chat room. We ask people for their E-mail address."'
Nonetheless, the critique has a great deal of validity, in that a "place" as
it is generally understood, has physical boundaries, a discernable shape,
or other describable physical characteristics. 1 2 A place is "mappable
using objective techniques." ' 1 3 These types of characteristics are clearly
lacking from the Internet. These, and other, critiques of a broad reading
of the ADA strongly affected the decision reached in the following case
study.

VII. ACCESS Now, INC. V. SOUTHWESTAIRLINES, CO."4
This case presented circumstances very similar to those
circumstances seen in Target Corp., but unlike the district court in
Northern California, a district court in Southern Florida reached a
completely contrary conclusion. The court's conclusion could only have
been reached if the judge had in fact subscribed to Justice Scalia's metacanon, which she did, as will be shown by this analysis. In Southwest
Airlines, Co., the plaintiffs' main contention was that the company's
website, Southwest.com, excluded them in violation of the ADA because
' 15
it prevented blind people from accessing its "virtual ticket counters."
The obstacle to accessing the website was the same as the one that
existed in National Federationof the Blind v. Target Corp., namely that
the software programs that the blind use to access the internet were
6
incompatible with the website design used by Southwest.com.1

109. Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521,523 (2003).
110. Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REv. 433,
444 (2003).
111. Symposium, supra note 47, at 868 (comments of Adam Milani).
112. Madison, supra note 110, at 486.
113. Id.
114. 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
115. Id. at 1314.
116. Id. at 1316.
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Southwest's website permitted users without disabilities to "check
airline fares and schedules, book airline, hotel, and car reservations, and
stay informed of Southwest's sales and promotions.""' 7
The defendant's argument in this case was virtually identical to the
argument presented by the defendants in Target Corp. It argued that its
website was not a "place of public accommodation" as defined in Title
III of the ADA," 8 and, in the alternative, that there was no nexus
of public
an actual place
Southwest.com and
between
accommodation. " 9 It should be noted, that the nexus argument would
only come into play if the court first determined that the relevant website
was in fact a place of public accommodation.
The court focused its analysis on the plain meaning of the statute,
and looked specifically at 42 U.S.C. § 12182, a section of the Act that
lists what qualifies as a "place of public accommodation."' 2 0 In direct
contrast to the reasoning in Target Corp., this court stated that "[i]n
interpreting the plain and unambiguous language of the ADA, and its
applicable federal regulations, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized
Congress's clear intent that Title III of the ADA governs solely access to
physical, concrete places of public accommodation."'' The court did not
feel the need to refer to outside sources to determine congressional
intent, or even to give great weight to the purpose clause contained
within the ADA. 22 The court quoted an Eleventh Circuit case that noted:
"because Congress has provided such a comprehensive definition of
'public accommodation,' we think that the intent of Congress is clear
enough.' 23 The court's argument that Congress provided a
comprehensive definition of "public accommodation" is in danger of
veering into the absurd. As has previously been noted, Congress
provided no definition of "public accommodation" within the text of the
ADA, comprehensive or otherwise. The sum total of the "definition" to
which the court refers is a listing of places that would qualify as public
accommodations. 24 However, a list, no matter how lengthy, is in no way
a comprehensive definition.

117. Id. at 1315.
118.

Id. at 1314.

119. Id.at 1319.
120. Id. at 1317-19.
121. Id. at 1318 (citing Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283-84 (1 th Cir.
2002) and Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237, 1241 (1 1th Cir. 2000)).
122. See id. at 1317-19.
123. Id. at 1318 (quoting Stevens, 215 F.3d at 1241) (internal quotation omitted)).
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000).
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The court's refusal to grant legitimacy to an analysis of
congressional intent has long been echoed and supported by Justice
Scalia. 125 However, like this court, Justice Scalia sometimes finds
himself contradicting his own doctrinal principles in favor of other
consideration. In Kyllo v. United States, 126 Justice Scalia wrote the
majority opinion and found that although the Framers could not have
foreseen certain technologies, such as thermal imaging devices, their
purpose in writing the Fourth Amendment was to protect the privacy of
the home.1 27 According to Justice Scalia, in the Fourth Amendment
context, the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was enough to
override the Fourth Amendment's obvious omission of a prohibition on
thermal imaging devices. 28 Why intent is relevant when dealing with
thermal imaging devices, but not relevant when dealing with a disabled
individual's ability to access the website, is a question to which an easy
answer does not present itself. This illustrates one of the basic problems
of Justice Scalia's meta-canon, namely that it often invites its adherents
to contradict themselves in extraordinary ways, as the Southwest Airlines
court did throughout its discussion of the case.
Despite the court's insistence that the statute is perfectly clear, it
did rely on a canon of statutory construction to buttress its argument.
The court used the canon to reaffirm the fact that Congress's listing of
possible "public accommodations" precludes the inclusion of the
Internet as one of these accommodations, since it is not specifically
listed. "Under the rule of ejusdem generis, 'where general words follow
a specific enumeration of persons or things, the general words should ' be
129
limited to persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated.'
The use of this canon will be addressed in greater depth at a later point,
however it should be noted that using the canon at all contradicts the
court's previous assertion that the statute is clear. As was previously
discussed, canons of construction, like all aids to statutory interpretation,
are used when the meaning of the text is unclear
and its true meaning
30
means.'
alternative
through
must.be discerned

125. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
126. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
127. Id. at 34.
128. The Fourth Amendment also fails to mention wiretaps; they however, along with various
other factors too numerous to analyze within this paper, have been found to fall under the purview
of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967).
129. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
(quoting Allen v. A.G. Thomas, 161 F.3d 667, 671 (1 lth Cir. 1998)).
130. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
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By insisting that the statute is clear, and by basing its decision on
the clarity of the statute, and then relying on canons of construction to
interpret the statute, the court contradicted itself in a truly remarkable
way. While the previous sentence should not in any way be construed as
saying that one can never use a canon of construction to buttress an
otherwise strong argument, the contradiction in this case rests on the fact
that the court's original argument simply does not stand up on its own. A
ruling on a clear statute, which includes such a "comprehensive
definition"1 31 should not have to rely on additional statutory tools of
interpretation to survive.
As to the nexus argument made by the parties, the court
acknowledged that it would be possible to find that a nexus existed
between the website and a physical place of public accommodation, as
the Target Corp. court did. The court chose to not follow this approach
despite being supplied with additional persuasive support of the First
Circuit having come to just such a conclusion. 132 Rather, the court
focused on precedent that had found that the Internet was, in fact, not a
"place" in that it is "a unique medium-known to its users as
'cyberspace'-located in no particular geographical location but
available 13to
anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the
3
Internet."
The case on which the court relied, Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, is arguably non-binding precedent, as the facts of that
case are not even somewhat reminiscent of the issues presented to this
court. First and foremost, Reno v. ACLU involved the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.134 The issue in the case was whether
the provisions prohibiting the distribution of pornography to minors over
the Internet were overly broad and in violation of the First
Amendment.1 35 The determinative factors for the Court were not in fact
that the Internet was not a place of public accommodation, but rather
that the statute itself was unconstitutionally broad, as it failed to provide
a definition of "indecent," was punitive, and was a "content-based
blanket restriction on speech."' 136 As such, relying on this particular
131. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2dat 1318.
132. Id. at 1319. National Federationof the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D.
Cal. 2006), was not available as precedent for this decision as it was decided four years after Access
Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
133. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851
(1997)).
134. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 857.
135. Id.at 864.
136. Id.at 868.
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precedent at the expense of other, far more on-point, precedent was just
one of the reasons that this court reached such a woefully misguided
conclusion.
VIII.

AGENCY INTERPRETATION

While the purpose of the statute was interpreted in two very
different ways in the preceding cases, both analyses were missing a key
piece of the puzzle that was brought up in various other similar settings.
The missing puzzle piece centers on the manner in which the agency
charged with interpreting the ADA construes the application of the ADA
to the Internet.
In interpreting the meaning of federal law, "the views of the agency
charged with primary responsibility for interpreting and enforcing that
law are entitled to considerable weight."13' 7 The DOJ is one of the
agencies in charge of interpreting and enforcing the ADA. 3 8 The DOJ
has consistently supported the notion that the ADA does in fact apply to
the Internet. 139 In a letter written by the DOJ to Senator Harkin, the
agency explicitly stated that entities choosing to communicate through
the Internet "must be prepared to offer those communications through
accessible means,"' 140 including "screen reading devices used by people
with visual impairments."' 14' The DOJ made clear that the Internet
should not be excluded from coverage under the ADA as it is "an
excellent source of information and, of course, people with disabilities
' 42
should have access to it as effectively as people without disabilities.'
The DOJ has also argued for the Internet to be covered under Title
III of the ADA in various amicus briefs. 43 In Hooks v. OKBridge, Inc.,
the DOJ filed an amicus brief asserting that reading Title III of the ADA
to exclude the Internet, an entity which did not exist in anything
approaching its present form at the time of the ADA's passage,
137.

Mendelsohn & Gould, supra note 51, at 190; ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN

INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 46 (1997).

138. Mendelsohn & Gould, supra note 51, at 190.
139. Maroney, supra note 46, at 201.
140. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Tom Harkin (Sept. 9,
1996) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review), available at http:/www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/cltr204.txt.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Hooks v.
OKBridge Inc., 232 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-50891) [hereinafter DOJ Hooks Amicus
Brief]; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 15, Rendon v.
Valleycrest Prods., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-11197) [hereinafter DOJ Rendon
Amicus Brief].
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would be analogous to holding that freedom of speech and freedom of
the press do not extend to electronic communications over the Internet
since such communications were not mentioned in the First
Amendment, or that the Fourth Amendment could not apply to the
privacy of telephone conversations because telephone wires do not
come within the ordinary meaning of the
144 words "persons, papers and
effects" used in the Fourth Amendment.
They also provided a key distinction, which has been cited by those
courts broadly applying the ADA, namely the aforementioned court in
Target Corp.,14 stating that "[t]he Act covers the services 'of a place of
public accommodation, not the services 'at' or 'in' a place of public
accommodation,"'146 thereby negating the requirement imposed by some
courts and scholars that the alleged discrimination must occur within an
actual brick and mortar establishment.
The DOJ anticipated an absurd result if Title III of the ADA was
read in the narrow manner mandated by Justice Scalia's meta-canon.
The DOJ envisioned the following scenario:
[A] company that offers services both on-site and through other means
(such as a travel service that arranges reservations both over the phone
and at a walk-in office) would be required to offer non-discriminatory
services on-site, but be free to discriminate over the phone or the
internet.
Neither the language of the statute, nor the underlying
purposes of
47
the Act, require or permit such an absurd result. 1
A.

An Absurd Result

The absurd result that would be created if Justice Scalia's metacanon were followed throughout the country is a direct result of the
Justice's strict adherence to the textualist doctrine. The plain meaning
rule that the textualists rely on has its roots in nineteenth century
England. 148 The rule literally states that "[i]f the words of an Act are
clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a manifest
absurdity."' 149 In this instance, Justice Scalia's meta-canon, and the plain
meaning rule from which it originates, manifests a blatantly absurd
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Mendelsohn & Gould, supra note 51, at 194.
Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
DOJ Hooks Amicus Brief, supra note 143, at 9.
Id. at 5.
See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 433 n.124.
Queen v. Judge of the City of London Court (1891) 1 Q.B. 273, 290.
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result, as has been recognized by various courts and governmental
institutions.
The DOJ has stated that limiting the ADA in a manner that
1 50
precludes its application to the Internet would lead to an absurd result.
The First Circuit has joined in the critique of such a limited reading of
the statute stating that "[i]t would be irrational to conclude that persons
who enter an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but
persons who purchase the same services over the telephone or by mail
are not. Congress could not have intended such an absurd result."1 51 The
Seventh Circuit has echoed this reasoning, stating that the core meaning
of Title III of the ADA is that
the owner or operator of a store, hotel .... Web site, or other facility
(whether in physical space or in electronic space), that is open to the
public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and,
once152in, from using the facility in the same way that the nondisabled
do.
The court also noted that this would run afoul of the main purpose of the
ADA and would "severely frustrate Congress's intent that individuals
with disabilities fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and
available indiscriminately to other members of the general
advantages,
3
public.

' 15

Scholars have also noted that reading the statute narrowly bars a
disabled person's ability to access the Internet, and as access was what
the ADA was supposed to provide, this can only be seen as an absurd
result.1 54 Cases are never decided in a vacuum and a vital consideration
in any decision is the precedent that it will set for future cases. If Title III
is found not to apply to the Internet because the Internet is not a physical
location, or because there is no nexus between the website and a
physical location, it will potentially create a precedent which would
narrow the ADA in a manner that is both absurd and irrational.
Communications conducted over the phone, through the mail, or in
any other manner that does not involve interaction in a finite physical
150. DOJ Hooks Amicus Brief, supra note 143, at 5.
151.

Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12,

19 (1st Cir. 1994).
152. Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
omitted).
153. Carparts,37 F.3d at 20.
154.

See Symposium, supra note 47, at 880 (comments of Richard E. Moberly).
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location, would not be covered by the ADA. However, "[t]he individual
with a disability no more travels to the public accommodation's post
office box or call center than to its web server. The person with a
disability who takes on-line courses does not go to the campus of the
private university"' 55 and "[s]imilarly, the individual with a disability
who sends a medical home-test kit to a laboratory for analysis never
goes anywhere near the laboratory's premises."' 156 All of these
interactions would allow discrimination against the disabled if the
narrow reading mandated by Justice Scalia's meta-canon is to be
adopted. As Judge Learned Hand aptly stated "[t]here is no surer way to
misread any document than to read it literally."' 57
B. Critiqueof Canons of Construction
Aside from the various policy and purpose arguments against a
narrow reading of the ADA, there are also various reasons why the
canons of construction used by the courts to justify a narrow reading are
not, in fact, valid. Courts use canons of construction when a statute's
meaning cannot be discerned from the plain language of the statute,
essentially, when the statute is unclear. 5 8 Therefore, for canons to be
applied to Title III of the ADA, courts must first determine that the
statute is unclear. Justice Scalia's meta-canon, as it was first articulated
59
by Abner J. Mikva and Eric Lane, applies only to unclear statutes.
Consequently, applying Justice Scalia's meta-canon even in conjunction
with other canons of interpretation, would consistently result in a narrow
reading of the statute. Certain canons lend themselves more readily to a
narrow reading of a certain statute, and it will be shown that the canons
used by those seeking to narrow the application of the ADA do in fact
conform to Justice Scalia's meta-canon.
Noscitur a sociis is a canon of construction that states that "the
meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the
words immediately surrounding it.' 60 This canon has been used by both
those seeking to apply the ADA narrowly and those seeking to apply it
broadly. Those who seek to broaden the statute to include the Internet
cite the fact that Title III includes such terms as "travel service"' 161 and
155. Mendelsohn & Gould, supra note 51, at 205.
156. Id.
157. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., concurring).
158.

MIKVA & LANE, supra note 137, at 22; Maroney, supra note 46, at 192.

159. Mikva & Lane, supra note 3, at 140.
160.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1087 (8th ed. 2004).

161.

42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2000).
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"public display."'' 62 The plaintiffs in Southwest Airlines, for instance,
argued that "travel service" is exactly what Southwest.com is, and
therefore the statute applies. 163 However, those who would seek to
follow Justice Scalia's meta-canon and apply this statute narrowly,
would look to the words surrounding "travel service," such as "beauty
shop," "barber shop," or "insurance office."' 164 Since all of the
aforementioned listed words are physical places, noscitur a sociis would
dictate that "travel service" should also be interpreted to apply only to
those travel services that are offered in a physical space and not on the
just this reasoning in Parker v.
Internet. 16 The Sixth Circuit followed
166
Co.
Insurance
Life
Metropolitan
Ejusdem generis is a canon of construction that states "that when a
general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or
phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same types as
those listed."' 167 Like the previous canon, this has been used to narrow
the reading of Title III of the ADA. The rationale is that because the list
of "'public accommodations' includes only physical spaces, any
general terms or words used must be interpreted as applying to only
physical spaces. 168 However, this statute could also be used to justify a
broad reading of the ADA, as was done by the First Circuit in Carparts
Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New
England.169 The court noted that "[b]y including 'travel service' among
the list of services considered 'public accommodations,' Congress
clearly contemplated that 'service establishments' include providers of
services which do not require a person to physically enter an actual
physical structure. '17 Itshould be noted that although these canons
should theoretically be used only when a statute is unclear, they have
ADA even when the court
been used to justify a narrow reading of the
7
asserted that the ADA was in fact "clear."'1 '

162.
163.
164.

§ 12181(7)(H).
Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2000).
Id.

165. Symposium, supra note 47, at 878 (comments of Richard E. Moberly).
166. Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that an
employer administered health plan was not within the scope of the ADA since the employee had not
visited the insurance company's offices).
167.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2004).

168. Symposium, supra note 47, at 878-79 (comments of Richard E.Moberly).
169.
(1st Cir.
170.
171.

Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, 37 F.3d 12, 20
1994).
Id. at 19.
Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides an analogy to the debate
over the ADA and the various canons addressed in this section. The
Fifth Circuit, in Dean v. Ashling, found that though "trailer parks" were
not contained in the list of types of rental housing covered by the Civil
Rights Act, this did not mean that Congress had meant to exclude trailer
parks from coverage.1 72 Our societal norms have expanded so that it
seems patently absurd to deny the protections of the Civil Rights Act to
those who live in trailer parks for no reason other than Congress failed to
include the specific term in the Act. Congress's reason for such an
exclusion can hardly be speculated at, but even the most casual observer
of American political life would never assume that the omission was a
conscious decision on the part of the legislature to exclude that particular
group of people from the benefits the rest of us gained from the passage
of the Civil Rights Act. Why then assume that Congress's omission of
the word "Internet" from Title III of the ADA was a conscious decision
to preclude the disabled from full and equal enjoyment of the Internet?
There are certainly numerous critiques that apply to the narrow
interpretive logic applied to the ADA and mandated by Justice Scalia's
meta-canon. However, the strongest critique stems from the fact that
when the statute was enacted the Internet did not exist in anything
approaching its current form, and its expansion was, arguably,
unimaginable by even the most forward-thinking legislatures. Almost
two decades ago, how many of us could have comprehended how
integrally the Internet would be involved in every facet of our lives? In
fact, how many of us were aware of the Internet at all at that particular
time? Therefore, the question begs to be asked, "[i]n the absence of a
conscious exclusion... does the statute's general purpose warrant

overlooking the absence of electronic space from the list of places of
173
public accommodation[s]?"'
C. Legislative Silence
Some scholars have cited Congress's failure to amend the Act to
include the Internet as an indication that Congress never intended for the
ADA to apply to the Internet at all. 174 They look to the fact that in 1998,
Congress amended Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act 175 to

172.
173.

Dean v. Ashling, 409 F.2d 754, 755-76 (5th Cir. 1969).
Maroney, supra note 46, at 199.

174.

Symposium, supranote 47, at 881 (comments of Richard E. Moberly).

175. The Rehabilitation Act was the predecessor of the ADA but applied only to the federal
government. See id.
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specifically require federal agencies to make their websites accessible to
the disabled. 176 By not taking the opportunity to make the same
articulated its
amendment to the ADA, scholars argue that Congress
77
Internet.1
the
encompass
not
intent that the ADA should
Using legislative silence as an indicator of how the legislature
intended a rule of law to be applied is a "problematic interpretive
exercise."' 178 The Supreme Court has echoed this concern stating "[i]t is
at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of
a controlling rule of law."'179 The hesitancy to rely on legislative silence
stems from many reasons, not the least of which is that it is difficult to
assume that the legislature is aware of every novel issue on which the
courts have ruled. 80 There are a myriad of reasons for why Congress
may have chosen not to act on a specific issue, for instance: "[c]omplete
disinterest; [b]elief that other measures have a stronger claim on the
limited time and energy of the body; [or] [b]elief that the bill is sound in
with."''81
principle but politically inexpedient to be connected
Attempting to ascertain Congress's intent in passing a statute is a
monumental task. Attempting to ascertain their intent in not acting at all
is an exercise in futility. For these reasons, the argument that Congress's
lack of action regarding Title III of the ADA is indicative of their intent,
is neither particularly convincing nor worthy of further discussion.
IX.

TITLES I AND II OF THE ADA

Analogizing Titles I and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
to the debate surrounding Title III provides an even greater insight as to
why excluding the Internet from coverage and reading Title III in the
extremely narrow manner mandated by Justice Scalia's meta-canon
leads to a truly absurd result. Title I of the ADA, like Title III, does not
82
contain an explicit reference to the Internet.' Title I of the ADA applies
to an employer's treatment of disabled employees and requires equal
treatment with respect to the terms, benefits, and conditions of
83
employment, including the opportunity to work. Courts to date have
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 137, at 37.
179. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
180. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 137, at 38.
181. HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1359 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
182. Mendelsohn & Gould, supra note 51, at 180.
183. See29C.F.R. § 1630.4 (2006).
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never found that Internet-related or Internet-based issues are outside the
scope of Title I simply
because the Internet was not explicitly cited
84
within the statute.'
Title II of the ADA bans state and local government discrimination
based on disability.185 The statutory language states that "[s]ubject to the
provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." '86 At all
levels of government there has been an increase in the use of electronic
communications, including online filings of forms and agency
communications with the public. 87 If courts chose to interpret Title II in
the same narrow manner that some courts have interpreted Title III, then
disabled individuals would find themselves further disadvantaged and
excluded.
With the recent advent of electronic filing (e-filing) of court
documents, a reading of Title II that precludes its application to the
Internet would, for instance, result in a situation in which a blind lawyer
would be essentially precluded from the practice of law. If courts are not
required to make their websites accessible to the blind because the ADA
does not apply to the Internet, it would be impossible for this individual
to file motions, briefs, or other paperwork due to their inability to access
any court's websites. It would be difficult to justify the narrow
application of the ADA in this setting, as few would willingly, or
convincingly, argue that a rational interpretation of the ADA could and
would ban disabled individuals from becoming lawyers.
Similar circumstances arose in 1995, when a blind city
commissioner in San Jose, California, sued the city for not making its
website accessible. 188 Due to the inaccessibility the city commissioner
was incapable of accessing the minutes of the city council meetings.189
This resulted in the city's adoption of the San Jose Web Page Disability
Access Design Standards.' 9" The standards were notable, first because
they validated the legitimacy of the claims filed by the disabled for
184. Mendelsohn & Gould, supra note 51, at 180.
185. Id. at 182.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
187. Mendelsohn & Gould, supra note 51, at 183.
188. Id. at 192.
189. Id.
190. Cynthia D. Waddell, City of San Jose, World Wide Web Page, Disability Access Design
Standards (Mar.
14, 1997), http://www.icdri.org/CynthiaW/city-of san-jose worldwide_
web_.htm.
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access to the Internet, and second because they provided a framework by
which access could in fact be granted.' 9'
Another equally compelling example can be found in the way that
the ADA applies to public transportation. Virtually all sectors of public
transportation maintain a website which provides data about schedules,
fares, routes, and other information. 192 In Martin v. MetropolitanAtlanta
Rapid Transit Authority, a suit was filed against the agency under the
ADA alleging that Transit Authority discriminated against the blind by
website. 93
not providing equal access to the information contained on its
The court granted the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction,
refusing to interpret the ADA in a manner that would preclude its
application to the Internet.' 94
Since the Internet is not explicitly mentioned in Titles I and II any
more than it is mentioned in Title III, it seems clear that in order to find
that Titles I and II apply to the Internet, one would be forced to stray
from the plain meaning rule and look to some extrinsic sources such as
legislative intent. Such a departure from the rule runs up against the very
foundation of Justice Scalia's meta-canon. This is evidenced by the fact
that Justice Scalia has refused to join the majority opinion in almost
every case in which the Supreme Court departed from the plain meaning
intent, and has often sharply criticized the
rule and utilized legislative
95
actions.
its
for
Court

191. Mendelsohn & Gould, supranote 51, at 192.
192. Id. at 186.
193. Martin v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1364-66 (N.D. Ga.
2002).
194. Id. at 1377.
195. See Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 283 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The text's the thing. We should
therefore ignore drafting history without discussing it, instead of after discussing it."); Thunder
Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219.(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518-19 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241-47 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v.
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 519 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring); Chisom v. Roemer,
501 U.S. 380, 404-05 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 67-69 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631-32 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 160-64 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part);
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss3/18

30

Govshtein: Justice Scalia and His Meta-Cannon of Absurdity
META-CA NON OF ABSURDITY

2007]

X.

CONCLUSION

It seems clear that reading the ADA in the extremely narrow
fashion that is mandated by Justice Scalia's meta-canon creates a result
that is directly contrary to the explicit purpose of the ADA 196 and to the
manner in which the statute has been interpreted by the DOJ. 19 7 The
ADA was enacted to ensure that the disabled would have access to all of
the things to which the non-disabled population readily has access.
Prohibiting the disabled population from accessing the Internet makes no
sense from either a logical, economic, or ethical perspective.
Logic dictates that when the DOJ states time and time again that
Title III of the ADA is intended to apply to the Internet,198 and when
courts routinely interpret Titles I and II to apply to the World Wide
Web, 199 excluding Title III simply makes no sense. Furthermore, with a
purpose clause as expansive as the one encompassed within the ADA,
there is no need to look to extrinsic sources to determine the intent of
Congress. It is as explicit as a statutory purpose can be, and there does
not seem to be any logical justification for blatantly ignoring the express
will of Congress.
Relying on canons of construction such as noscitur a sociis and
ejusdem generis to justify a narrow reading of the statute is a somewhat
self-serving exercise, as it requires Congress to look into the future when
they are passing a statute. It is undoubted that the Internet, as it now
exists or even as it existed five or eight years ago, could not have been
contemplated by Congress, particularly since it was inconceivable to
some of the foremost experts in the field. Therefore, determining that
discrimination against the blind is warranted based on this rationale is
nonsensical. Congress cannot be expected to anticipate every
technological advance that might occur in the coming decades, and a
failure to anticipate such advances cannot and should not be used as a
means to drastically limit the application of a statute.
As has been shown, there is also no compelling economic reason
for limiting the application of the ADA. 20 0 Not only is altering a website
economically feasible, particularly for such large companies as Target or
Southwest Airlines, but the increase in Internet traffic for those sites and,
implicitly, an increase in the number of individuals purchasing goods off
196.
197.
198.

42 U.S.C. § 12 101(b) (2000).
See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
See DOJ Hooks Amicus Brief, supra note 143, at 6-20; DOJ Rendon Amicus Brief, supra

note 143, at 15.
199.
200.

See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
See Mendelsohn & Gould, supra note 51, at 206.
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those sites, creates an economic incentive to comply with the ADA. If
simply ethical considerations are not enough, there is also the possibility
that companies' profit margins would actually increase by granting
access to disabled individuals.
While the economic implications are certainly an issue, perhaps the
most compelling argument to be made concerns the long-term effects of
adhering to Justice Scalia's meta-canon. The meta-canon not only
requires a narrow reading of the ADA but also requires a narrow reading
in virtually all cases in which statutory interpretation is at issue. As has
been shown in this analysis, such a limited view of a statute requires an
almost willful disregard of the purpose of the statute. When Justice
Scalia articulates his approach to statutory interpretation, it becomes
clear why adherence to his meta-canon will often lead to absurdity.
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not
on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood
by a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis
of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary
usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole
Congress which voted on the words of the statute ... and (2) most
compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision
must be integrated... I would not permit any of the historical and
legislative material[s] ... 20to1 lead me to a result different from the one
that these factors suggest.
Justice Scalia's suggested analysis of a statute literally mandates
that legislative materials that ate indicative of legislative intent must be
ignored. When courts intentionally ignore congressional purpose in
reaching decisions that impact vast segments of the population it can
only be by sheer luck that a truly absurd result is avoided. In the context
of the ADA, the absurd result created by certain courts is to limit the
ability of a disabled individual to access the Internet, a forum in which,
arguably, that individual could have achieved a.greater sense of freedom
and independence than is possible without such access.
In short, the application of Justice Scalia's meta-canon creates not
only unfair, absurd, and unforeseen results for the disabled population
within the context of the ADA, but creates a dangerous precedent. If all
courts adopt such a strictly textualist approach, enacted statutes will be
so limited in scope that Congress will be forced to return to the same
issues time and time again as circumstances change and as courts remain
unwilling to evolve along with the society around them. The burden that
201.

Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia's meta-canon creates is not borne solely by Congress, or
the disabled. A strict textualist reading of every statute in accordance
with the meta-canon would also burden the courts, as they would be
"asked to second-guess ...nearly every law that Congress passed., 20 2
Justice Scalia's meta-canon would unduly burden every facet of our
legal system. For that, and the numerous aforementioned reasons, it can
only be hoped that Justice Scalia's meta-canon remains an intellectual
curiosity and does not infect the legal minds of future generations.
Ella Govshtein*
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